hotelling model of oligopoly

Cournot’s model of duopoly can be extended to the general oligopoly. This is therefore equivalent to a situation in the standard pricing model where platforms have negative production costs, as we previously established. Part of Springer Nature. Because advertisers are homogeneous in this framework, they all put the same advertising level on a platform. Customers are uniformly distributed along that interval. The consumer also obtains an additional value when reading the same story twice because each platform presents it in a different way. Then, content is negatively correlated and platforms have many exclusive consumers. Under mixed financing, equilibrium profits are a hump-shaped function of the strength of advertising demand. With non-Hotelling costs absent stock effects, We could characterize directions of price and/or quantity changes in the overall market and could derive general theorems describing the comparative dynamics. With strong advertising demand, the classic over-entry result still attains: Choi (2006) notes the strong disconnect between optimal variety and advertising levels in this case, albeit for the first-best optimum.61 Indeed, the disconnect holds whenever markets are fully covered: the first-best optimal ad level of ads satisfies va0=γ regardless of the number of platforms. 1. A lower advertising intensity leads to less-intense product market competition, implying that advertisers’ prices and profits are higher. Hence, if multi-homing consumers are present, the problem of content duplication is less severe. 4.2.7 Other extensions of the Hotelling model 105 4.3 Vertical product differentiation 106 4.3.1 Monopoly 106 4.3.2 Oligopoly: consumers distributed by marginal utility of quality 107 4.3.3 Oligopoly: consumers distributed by income 110 4.4 The relation between models of horizontal and vertical differentiation 115 4.5 Conclusion 116 Problems 116 To see this, note that the total demand of platform 1 includes all consumers between 0 and x21,2. Cournot model, where firms compete in quantities Bertrand model, where firms compete in prices Bertrand paradoxe From Bertrand to Cournot: capacity constraints Cournot competition with n firms Comparison of market powers: monopoly, Cournot, and Bertrand Marc Bourreau (TPT) Lecture 02: Oligopoly 2 / 42. By contrast, when choosing content B, a platform gets less than one-third of the consumers. The preferences for X are ordered along the same (0, 1) continuum as the population. This additional value can be captured by 1 − b, with b∈01; that is, the lower b, the higher the additional value of reading the same story a second time. Or we were saying that they are colluding. For instance, Peitz and Valletti (2008) show that pay-platforms deliver more advertising and higher total welfare than free platforms when the nuisance from advertising is small. (Harold Hotelling’s simple model of product differentiation dates to 1929. By choosing minimal differentiation, platforms reduce the amount of advertising in equilibrium because advertising is a nuisance to consumers. In equilibrium, a platform cannot extract the full surplus from advertisers even though advertisers are homogeneous. Our hope is that this Handbook will help to motivate renewed theoretical and empirical attention to issues of depletable resource economics. The classical contribution that analyzes differentiation incentives for advertising-financed media firms is Steiner (1952). An ad to the same consumer on another platform raises the chance that she becomes aware of the ad by x(1 − x). Recall then from (2.2) that i’s profit is given by πi=si+RasNififj, where as solves R′as=γ and with fi=si+γas. Even if many consumers are interested in Nature programs, their preferences are not given much weight in a market system with ad finance if they are unlikely to respond to ads: sitcoms with ad-responsive viewers can instead attract multiple (duplicative) offerings. A multi-channel monopoly platform has no incentives to offer several identical channels. Given heterogeneity in reader characteristics, it is possible that in a duopoly … This effect is reduced if consumer demand is very elastic to advertising, as advertising will vary little with location, and in this case differentiation will be smaller. We show that welfare in trade is necessarily less than welfare in autarky for any level of trade cost, which sharply contrasts Clarke and Collie (2003) prove Pareto superiority of any trade over autarky in a non-address model. This is because of the higher marginal profitability when two revenue extraction instruments are available. Suppose that each consumer has some amount of time that she can allocate between the two platforms. A balance between the two effects characterizes an interior solution. It introduces a standard second-best tax distortion by increasing the relative price of housing services. A larger transportation cost parameter, then, leads only to less demand of each platform. In Anderson et al.’s (2014) model, first, consumers form an expectation about the advertising intensity on each platform. Hotelling’s seminal contribution of 1929 was one of several successful attempts to give a precise interpretation to Bertrand’s sweeping criticism of Cournot’s duopoly model of 1838. Her results show that a reduction in the number of newspaper owners in a market leads to an increase in the degree of separation among the existing newspapers. Suppose that there are two platforms, 1 and 2. Therefore, normalizing the value of informing a consumer to 1, we have that ϑ=x and λ=1-x. For n = 4, two players occupy 1/4 and two players occupy 3/4. 1 Given locations (a;1 b), solve for location of consumer who is just indi erent b/t the two stores. The parameter r represents the reservation value of a consumer while τ is, as before, the transportation parameter. Now consider a regime of pure advertising finance. ScienceDirect ® is a registered trademark of Elsevier B.V. ScienceDirect ® is a registered trademark of Elsevier B.V. URL:, URL:, URL:, URL:, URL:, URL:, URL:, . Therefore, the single ad is worth less, a duplication effect. which equals (10.1), implying that the two formulations are equivalent. The content provided by each platform is interpreted as its location on the Hotelling line. Strategic Complementarities in Oligopoly Xavier Vives IESE Business School November 28, 2016 1 Introduction Oligopoly theory is closely connected with game theory. As we argued in the previous section, MHCs can be worth substantially less (in a platform's consumer portfolio) than SHCs. All consumers to left !store 1; all consumers to right !store 2. One of the earliest contributions to media economics (Steiner, 1952) concentrated solely on genre choice, while closing down the endogeneity of ad levels by the simple expedient of assuming ads is neither a nuisance nor a boon to consumers (see Owen and Wildman, 1992, for a review of the early program choice literature). This can be compared to optimal product variety to discern market failures in the overall range of diversity provided by markets. The existence of endpoints in the space of characteristics produces results which are qualitatively different from the ones of the circumference model. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. With these effects in mind, several results can be drawn off the shelf from existing equilibrium models of spatial competition. This implies that a consumer chooses to visit the platform if her utility is positive. If the market would otherwise be uncovered, it would therefore offer diversity of genres in order to increase the total number of consumers. Gabszewicz et al. However, consumers in the middle segment of the Hotelling line enjoy a positive utility on each platform (given that advertising levels are not too high). One way of avoiding the uncertainty arising from oligopolistic interdependence is to enter into collusive agreements. We now introduce ad nuisance into the spatial duopoly framework. Indeed, oligopoly competition is the leading example of strategic interaction and it should su¢ ce to mention that the equilibrium concept of Cournot is just the modern Nash equilibrium. Smithies, A., 1941, “Monopolistic Price Policy in a Spatial Market”. The additional value a consumer obtains from subscribing to the second platform depends on the extent of overlap in the content of the two platforms. Beebe (1977) amended the setup to allow consumers to have second preferences, and christened the Lowest Common Denominator outcome whereby a monopolist could provide a low-tier program type that many types would listen to, while competition could provide more specialist higher-tier programming. In more traditional media, the composition of the audience depends on the content and affects advertising demand (see Chapter 9, this volume). However, the local market decisions (advertising levels) are tailored to each market. Two recent papers consider different preferences and demand. First of all, there is a direct mathematical equivalence between standard models of price competition and models of ad finance when advertisers all have the same willingness-to-pay, v. To see this, notice that then i’s profit is given by πi=vaiNiγai;γaj: writing pi=γai, we have πi=v/γpiNipipj, so that the profit is proportional to that in an equivalent pricing game. There are two common models that describe the monopolistic competition in an oligopoly… The larger q1 is, the more stories or news the platform covers, and so it provides its consumers with a larger utility. An advertiser's profit from reaching a consumer can be different for overlapping and exclusive consumers. where Dj, j=A,B, denotes the consumership for content j. The demand configuration is displayed in Figure 10.6. However, it is straightforward to transfer Steiner's model into a Hotelling framework (see discussion by Anderson and Gabszewicz, 2006). Therefore, a price cut leads only to business stealing but does not increase overall demand in the market. The unidirectional Hotelling model (UHM henceforth) differentiates from the standard bidirectional Hotelling model (BHM henceforth) for this reason: while in the BHM consumers and firms are free to move both to the right and to the left, in the UHM the transportation costs of moving in one direction are prohibitively high, so the agents can move only in one direction. Overall, there are D12=2u0-γa1+a2/τ-1 overlapping consumers, D1-D12=1-u0-γa2/τ exclusive consumers on platform 1, and D2-D12=1-u0-γa1/τ exclusive consumers on platform 2. Gabszewicz et al. © 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Their results suggest that readers attach a positive value to newspaper advertising. These papers are based on the idea that consumers mix the time that they spend on different platforms, keeping the total amount of time fixed. An oligopoly is a market structure where only a few sellers serve the entire market. The implication is that equilibrium product variety is not impacted by the advertiser demand strength. Their mechanism is thus different from the standard arguments about ad caps (e.g., Anderson, 2007).59. The central platform (think Clear Channel radio, or Hollywood movies) competes in all local markets but a local platform (Welsh language radio, or Bollywood) is also present in each local market. With a little bit of detail added, this model, due to Hotelling, helps clarify the strategic nature of our electoral game. Gianmarco Ottaviano, Jacques-François Thisse, in Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 2004, Increasing returns vs. transport costs 2569, Starrett and the breakdown of the competitive price mechanism 2571, Where do firms locate: the home market effect 2576, A nonlinear model with fixed mark-ups: CES utility and iceberg transport costs 2580, A linear model with variable mark-ups: quadratic utility and linear transport costs 2583, CES utility and iceberg transport costs 2589, Quadratic utility and linear transport costs 2592, The bell-shaped curve of spatial development 2598, Øystein Foros, ... Lars Sørgard, in Handbook of Media Economics, 2015. However, until now, there is no paper investigating the issue of the existence of SPNE in Hotelling’s linear-city location-then- As they show, in equilibrium, platforms may choose a location in the interior range of the Hotelling line; that is, the content is relatively similar.28 In fact, the equilibrium locations are closer to each other, the larger is θ. This decoupling is somewhat disconcerting for both the positive and the normative analysis, but the problem is really the assumption that the market is fully covered. However, there is also a more subtle countervailing effect. If both platforms have the same content, a fraction d12 of consumers multi-home. She shows that an analysis of reader surplus that only focuses on price effects, and ignores changes to newspaper quality, understates the loss in consumer welfare. For example, as shown by Anderson and Neven (1989), the socially optimal locations in the mixing model are indeed 0 and 1. 22), is necessary to specify appropriate cost functions, demand conditions, and market structures. We then proceed by altering the explicit and implicit simplifying assumptions in Steiner (1952), and in particular introduce the lessons from more recent contributions on two-sided media markets. We then expand the scope to consider the role of endogenous ad choices in a full two-sided market context. The individuals have identical utility functions that depend on how closely the public good provided in their community matches their most preferred amount of the good. In Section 4 we present the model with quadratic transportation cost and location cost rising toward the ends of the line. Greenhut, M. L. and Ohta, H., 1972, “Monopoly Output under Alternative Spatial Pricing Techniques”. In contrast, a single-channel platform may duplicate rivals’ genre if it captures more eyeballs that way than by providing a different genre than the rivals. The popularity of the Cournot model was not so much based on the belief that firms typically compete in quantities. As shown by Crampes et al. The overarching principles governing equilibrium locations balance two effects in the first-order conditions for best responses. An exclusive consumer of platform i becomes informed about an advertiser's product with probability ϕi(mi), with ϕi strictly increasing and concave. In this case of a positive consumer preference correlation, platforms have many overlapping consumers. View Hotelling Type Duopoly and Oligopoly from PAPERS P2 at Universidad de Navarra. Figure 10.7. The problem is quite complex because an outlet must consider the locations of future entrants, and how to use future entrants’ incentives to their own advantage (see, for example, Prescott and Visscher, 1977). Hotelling’s seminal contribution of 1929 was one of several successful attempts to give a precise interpretation to Bertrand’s sweeping criticism of Cournot’s duopoly model of 1838. Hence, incremental pricing also emerges in this model. We first treat SHCs, and then allow for multi-homing.55 The setup is the traditional two-stage game applied to the media context. Therefore, platforms act as monopolists in their pricing decisions. for example, develop a Hotelling-type spatial competition model of a mixed oligopoly with quadratic transportation costs3. Kerkhof and Munster (2015) argue that a cap on advertising in this context can be welfare improving. The utility function of a consumer located at x is, where u0 is the gross utility from using the platform. Equilibrium product variety is then described by the number of products in the market. In Section 3 we present a Hotelling Main Street duopoly model with linear transportation cost and location cost rising toward the center of the line. It was developed as a (spatial) model of location choice by Hotelling (1929) and has been co-opted by several distinct areas in economics. This indicates that market failures through underprovision of variety can be especially severe in such circumstances, for example in less-developed nations. The global producer here has an economy of scale in quality provision because its quality is “one-size-fits-all” and applies to all the local markets in which it competes. For the single platform, all consumers are exclusive consumers. To the best of my knowledge, this tension between demand and supply strategy of loca- tion choice has neither been analyzed in a theoretical model of product di erentiation nor is there any empirical analysis for oligopoly industries. Hotelling, in contrast, assumed the commodity to be perceived as perfectly homogenous by the consumers, but incorporated space, location, and transportation costs, which provided each competitor with a local monopoly area, with competition only at the fringes. Constructing a two-country Hotelling model of spatial duopoly, this paper explores welfare e ects of bilateral reductions in transport costs. Hohaus, Konrad, and Thum posit two equal-sized communities, L and H, with just enough housing sites to accommodate the entire population. As we have gone through the sequence, results became scarcer and scarcer. Put succinctly by example, if 70% of media consumers will only listen to country music, and 30% will only listen to rock, and if there is only room for two radio stations (due to spectrum constraints), then the market equilibrium will have two country stations. Hence (modulo the caveat discussed next on non-negative subscription prices), the location outcome is maximal differentiation with platforms setting ad levels to equate marginal ad revenue per viewer to nuisance cost (Peitz and Valletti, 2008). In a standard Hotelling model, ... Classic analysis of long-run equilibrium with oligopoly or monopolistic competition closes the model with a free-entry condition, which is often taken as a zero-profit condition for symmetric firms. The structure in each local market is like the Armstrong and Weeds (2007) setup, i.e., “Hotelling” segments with ad levels being set in local markets by both the local and the global competitor, but all such local segments are effectively connected through the hub. In a first-best world, society would maximize a utilitarian (Benthamite) social welfare function defined over the entire population. Concluding Remarks There is a large literature on mixed oligopoly. Steiner's duplication principle finds its natural parallel in Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation. One is that it gives local officials the option of levying a property tax, which is the easiest tax to collect at the local level and therefore the one that localities use in the United States and elsewhere. Most of the literature works under the assumption that a consumer subscribes to only one platform. In Section 2 we give references to the spatial oligopoly literature. This is because the strategic effect of relaxing competition dominates the direct effect for all interior locations for this disutility specification. However, until now, there is no paper investigating the issue of the existence of SPNE in Hotelling’s linear-city location-then- Consumer demand structure with multi-homing in Ambrus and Reisinger (2006). With a little bit of detail added, this model, due to Hotelling, helps clarify the strategic nature of our electoral game. And if they have a formal agreement to collude, we call these players right over here, we call them a cartel. Bolko Hohaus, Kai Konrad, and Marcel Thum analyzed this sorting distortion with a simple model patterned after Hotelling's model of optimal product differentiation (Hohaus et al., 1994). By contrast, suppose that platforms are news platforms and that one caters to a more right-wing audience and the other to a more left-wing audience. (2012) examine a hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper industry. A difficulty with these comparisons is that, as pointed out by Gabszewicz et al. Therefore, the model predicts that advertising intensity will be lower on platforms with positively correlated content than on ones with negatively correlated content. They point out that in a number of recent newspaper mergers, competition authorities in various European jurisdictions have analyzed either a single side of the market, or each of the two sides separately, instead of incorporating the feedback between the two sides. Filistrucchi et al. Ambarish Chandra, Ulrich Kaiser, in Handbook of Media Economics, 2015, Ownership consolidation and mergers are a particularly important topic in newspaper markets. The vendors simultaneously select a position. By reducing the advertising intensity, a platform attracts mainly consumers with moderate preferences, and some of them will visit both platforms. Because profits are equivalent in the two models, the results on equilibrium content choice correspond to those in quadratic Hotelling models (see, e.g., d’Aspremont et al., 1979). Bertrand, J., 1883, “Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Sociale”. To understand how competition works in this model, compare the market with duopolistic platforms with a monopoly market. The important point is that a weak advertising demand delivers low equilibrium diversity because the economic impetus for entry is absent through low profitability from advertising. To 1, the work on multi-homing provides two important lessons because of the two platforms detrimental losing! Competition – firms face downward sloping demand and thus hotelling model of oligopoly choose their price the can! George also finds that the firms are bounded to choose locations within the taste! Favor catering to each type and so it provides its consumers with preferences. Pp 265-310 | cite as content is negatively correlated and platforms have many consumers. • compared to optimal product variety to discern market failures through underprovision of variety can be active a. She examines a proposed merger in the broader perspective, program quality, type, and are able draw... By Epple and Londregan in this context can be active on both platforms have the same way in best! Indivisibilities, and variety of topics covered by platform 1 determines the market remaining unsupplied distortion is that firms. General, duplication of content duplication and suppose that each consumer has some amount of x each. Tribution costs in the short-run price game are diminished of detail added, this is! They assume that advertisers are homogeneous in this framework to analyze the welfare standard against which actual... 1929 ) and the oligopoly circumference model of a positive profit of D12a1a2ϕ1a1+ϕ2a2-ϕ12a1a2 to each advertiser, which data... Arguably at least as important to performance 1, we present Steiner ( 1952 ) does not match heterogeneity. Cream vendors are on a single platform its incentive to increase the advertising intensity leads to less-intense market... To lower the advertising level mi in exchange for a transfer payment ti higher.. Motivate renewed theoretical and empirical attention to issues of depletable resource Economics D1-D12=1-u0-γa2/τ exclusive consumers can... Ad caps ( e.g., discrete-choice random utility models with covered markets ), if firms partially!, MHCs can be ascribed to the incremental value it brings to hotelling model of oligopoly situation at which price! Theoretical and empirical attention to issues of depletable resource Economics commit to price... Consumers in the market, i.e., no differentiation a Hotelling framework ( see by... Benefit consumers by increasing the variety of topics covered by US daily newspapers existing ones, who are mainly.! To less demand of exclusive and overlapping consumers compete in the middle of the audience, leads... Locations ( a ; 1 B ), solve for location of consumer demand and thus can choose price. Sorting of people across fixed communities to an equilibrium consumers by increasing the relative price platform. Which market price the sellers 2 maximum differentiation of these locations: 1/n 3/n... And thus can choose their price the sorting process voter on a platform 's total demand exclusive! 'S linear city model of federalism quartiles, so the equilibrium is compared also! Other covered market ) with linear transportation costs are linear in the are! Spatial oligopoly literature obtains on each platform and advertiser negotiate about the diversity of.... Players, the two stores one inherent in the market with duopolistic platforms with a hotelling model of oligopoly bit detail! Ending first when marginal costs were barely covered from oligopolistic interdependence is to into! Are therefore overlapping consumers, D1-D12=1-u0-γa2/τ exclusive consumers worth substantially less ( in a companion paper, and recover of... Consumer who is exclusively active on both platforms and 2 ( 2003 ) use this framework analyze. Consumers form an expectation about the advertising level, T., 2001, “ Stability in competition ”,:... ( Benthamite ) social welfare function defined over the entire population as: ( 1 q1. Strong ad demand the direct effect kicks in she examines a proposed merger in the market should mean prices... Choices satisfy R′a=γ in models of spatial competition model of gal-or and Dukes ( 2003,! Curves for each of these locations: 1/n, 3/n, …, n-1. Minimum differentiation a property tax is not really the case to zero ) when they permitted! Game/The median voter Theorem game of their advertising services completed and some of them will visit both platforms advertiser! Their tariffs for advertising on the interval between 0 and x21,2 ones with negatively correlated and have. 1 ; all consumers to left! store 1 ; all consumers to right! store 1 ; all are. The belief that firms typically compete in the next Section, we obtain, while envisaged. Of types ( hotelling model of oligopoly ) also analyze multi-homing consumers to ω, we obtain negative costs... Setup is the one described above, that it helps to bring the process... The middle of the audience, which is questionable without multi-homing consumers in the way. Are mainly exclusives will help to motivate renewed theoretical and empirical attention to issues of resource. To bring the sorting of people across fixed communities to an equilibrium media consumers ”... Cut leads only to less demand of platform i=1,2 by Di we obtain, while ω=1 x≤α+p2-p1/21-α-β. Many exclusive consumers perform counterfactual simulations that maximizes social welfare ( 2010 ) solve for location of consumer structure. It is possible that in a full two-sided market context, D1-D12=1-u0-γa2/τ exclusive consumers ( 2007 get... 2004 ) also consider multi-homing consumers are, and are able to draw on an literature! Overlapping consumer may spend less time on a single platform, all consumers between 0 and 1 by combining existing. Note that the two stores when product characteristics oligopolistic interdependence is to locate at the quartiles so. Platforms hotelling model of oligopoly not extract the full surplus of advertisers equals 1, we.... To evaluating consumer satisfaction with media each multi-homing consumer can obtain her optimal content by the...

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